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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article will provide an overview of a Multisystemic 
Risk Management (MRM) model of juvenile justice that attempts 
to shift the focus of juvenile justice policy from retributive 
punishment to recidivism reduction and crime prevention.1 The 
MRM model is guided by parallel trends in the fields of 
psychology and law towards forward-looking systemic models to 
inform decision making and influence human behavior. In 
psychology, early models of human behavior that focused 
narrowly on internal, unidimensional mental states to explain or 
change complex behavior have been supplemented by more 
ecological, multisystemic models that consider contextual 
influences on human behavior and span biological, 
psychological, and social levels of analysis. This body of cutting 
edge behavioral science research presents challenges to 
traditional mens rea analysis in criminal law and highlights the 
potential injustice of retribution as the basis for legal sanctions. 
The MRM model promises to improve the fairness, 
effectiveness, and efficiency of the juvenile justice system by 
integrating these innovations from psychology with converging 
trends in law.   
In the legal system, and the area of administrative law in 
particular, recent conceptualizations of due process have gone 
beyond the traditional backward-looking, case-by-case 
adversarial model toward more system-wide, forward-looking 
managerial models that emphasize measurable fairness, 
accuracy, and efficiency in decision making aimed at 
implementing substantive policy goals.2 In previous work, I have 
attempted to synthesize these converging trends into what I have 
                                                          
1 For an expanded discussion of this perspective, see generally 
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN & MARK R. FONDACARO, JUVENILES AT RISK: A 
PLEA FOR PREVENTIVE JUSTICE (2011).   
2 See generally Mark R. Fondacaro et al., Reconceptualizing Due 
Process in Juvenile Justice: Contributions from Law and Social Science, 57 
HASTINGS L.J. 955 (2006) (arguing juvenile justice models that focus on 
enhancing measureable fairness, accuracy, and efficiency may be 
procedurally and substantively superior to contemporary adult criminal 
procedures and culpability-based models). 
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called an “Ecological Jurisprudence.”3 In essence, the MRM 
model of juvenile justice represents a specific application of the 
Ecological Jurisprudence framework. Throughout this Article, 
the MRM model will be contrasted with traditional approaches 
to juvenile justice, with an emphasis on those rooted in 
principles of moral judgment and retribution.4  
Part II of this Article identifies and presents challenges to 
traditional models of criminal responsibility that are grounded in 
outdated and empirically unsupported legal presumptions about 
human behavior. Part III examines trends towards more 
ecological models of human behavior in the behavioral sciences. 
Part IV tracks analogous legal trends in administrative models of 
due process and procedural justice. Based on a synthesis of these 
parallel trends in the behavioral sciences and the law, Part V 
presents general principles of an MRM model of juvenile 
justice. Finally, Part VI concludes with an outline that illustrates 
what such a model might look like. 
II. LIMITATIONS OF TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Criminal law doctrines have always reflected common sense 
notions about human nature and the causes of human behavior. 
                                                          
3 See generally Mark R. Fondacaro, Toward an Ecological Jurisprudence 
Rooted in Concepts of Justice and Empirical Research, 69 UMKC L. REV. 
179 (2000) (arguing the law should reflect an updated understanding of 
contextual influences on human behavior). As noted previously, “[o]ne of the 
first tasks of an ecological jurisprudence would be to bring legal assumptions 
about human behavior in line with empirical research conducted over the past 
century demonstrating the powerful influences that situational factors have on 
guiding and directing individual behavior.” Id. at 192. Moreover, through the 
lens of an ecological jurisprudence, basic social psychological research on 
procedural and distributive justice becomes more salient, guiding the 
development of procedures aimed at promoting fair and accurate decision 
making and advancing substantive policy goals, such as recidivism reduction 
and crime prevention, that are perceived as legitimate. See id. at 195. 
4 See generally Christopher Slobogin & Mark R. Fondacaro, Juvenile 
Justice: The Fourth Option, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2009) (arguing a prevention-
based juvenile system is superior to the contemporary culpability-based 
system). 
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In our Western liberal democracy, both criminal law doctrines 
and the common sense notions they reflect traditionally have 
focused on an individual’s personal choices or conscious will as 
the primary if not sole determinative force behind criminal 
behavior. Although the law tracks common sense or “folk 
psychology” conceptions of human behavior rather closely, it is 
much slower and more removed from scientific advances in how 
we conceive of complex causes and consequences of human 
behavior. For example, I like to ask my students whether they 
have ever taken a course in psychology or criminology that has 
covered the topic of criminal or deviant behavior. Almost all of 
them raise their hands. I then ask them whether they recall the 
extensive body of research conducted over the past century on 
the “evil doer” theory of crime. Typically, none raise a hand 
and most looked puzzled until I inform them that no serious or 
systematic research on the causes of crime has been rooted in an 
“evil doer” theory. Yet that is the implicit theory underlying the 
criminal law. 
In traditional criminal law, two conditions must be met in 
order for a person to be found guilty of a crime. First, the 
person must have committed a bad act (actus reus), and second, 
the individual must have had a guilty mind (mens rea) at the 
time that he or she committed the offense. Given a particular 
bad act (e.g., killing a person), whether or not a defendant is 
found to be legally accountable turns on judgments about the 
individual’s mental state at the time of the offense. For example, 
under the Model Penal Code (MPC): if a person is judged to 
have acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, he is 
legally accountable for his crime and subject to punishment. If 
on the other hand, he is judged to have acted without a guilty 
mind or in a non-negligent manner, he is not legally responsible 
or subject to criminal punishment. 
The severity of punishment sanctioned for a crime under the 
MPC increases with the perceived degree of culpability at the 
time of the offense (i.e., more punishment for an illegal act 
committed with purpose than one committed recklessly). The 
justification for meting out more severe punishment for more 
culpable mental states is grounded largely in principles of 
retribution and just deserts, which is the notion that a person 
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should be punished in proportion to his or her moral culpability 
for the offense—no more and no less—reflecting the “evil doer” 
theory of crime. 
As suggested above, the idea that people should be punished 
in proportion to their moral blameworthiness is rooted in 
Western Liberal notions of autonomous individualism. That is, it 
is assumed that people make conscious choices that guide their 
behavior and that people who break the law choose to do so and 
can choose to do otherwise. This notion of free choice and the 
legal presumption of autonomous individualism provide the 
rationale and justification for retributive punishment. Although 
this legal presumption of autonomous individualism is consistent 
with common sense notions about human nature and in fact is 
generally consistent with folk psychological notions as well,5 it 
is not consistent with the overwhelming weight of behavioral 
science research on the actual causes and determinants of human 
behavior.6 
There are several lines of behavioral science research that 
challenge the presumption present in both law and folk 
psychology that human behavior is almost fully guided by 
conscious human thought. Although a comprehensive review of 
these separate lines of research is beyond the scope of this 
Article, I will outline their contours and main findings. First, it 
is important to point out that in the legal context, determination 
of mens rea is based on a retrospective, social judgment about 
what a person was (or was not) thinking at the time he or she 
committed an illegal act—in essence, retrospective mind reading. 
It should be noted that in the criminal law, and under the MPC 
in particular, mens rea determinations are presumed to assess 
and represent the actual subjective mental state of the defendant 
at the time of the offense, with the rare exception of criminal 
                                                          
5 See generally BERTRAM F. MALLE, HOW THE MIND EXPLAINS 
BEHAVIOR: FOLK EXPLANATIONS, MEANING, AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 
(2004) (analyzing folk psychological notions). 
6 See generally Daniel M. Wegner & Thalia Wheatley, Apparent Mental 
Causation: Sources of the Experience of Will, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 480 
(1999) (explaining various experiments that demonstrate how the subjective 
experience of conscious will is distinct from the actual causal chain that leads 
people to act).  
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offenses based on a negligence standard of culpability. This 
raises questions about how reliable and consistent individuals (a 
judge or jurors in the case of a criminal trial) are in making 
retrospective judgments about what particular defendants were 
actually thinking at the time each committed an offense. 
Moreover, even if jurors are consistent or reliable, it does not 
mean their retrospective judgments of past mental state are 
accurate or valid; instead, they may be consistently biased or 
just plain wrong. 
If the criminal law presumes that almost all of human 
behavior is guided by conscious choices about whether to obey 
the law, then clearly early theoretical speculation about the 
“unconscious” by Sigmund Freud and his followers provides a 
potential basis for calling this presumption into question. 
However, we do not have to rely on Freudian speculation about 
unconscious processes to cast doubt on legal presumptions about 
human behavior; there is a new body of systematic behavioral 
science research referred to as the “new unconscious” that 
draws on cutting edge social psychological and cognitive 
neuroscience research to challenge the notion that most human 
behavior is guided directly by conscious deliberation or 
intentionality.7 This line of research suggests that little, if any, 
human behavior conforms to legal presumptions or folk 
psychological notions of consciously or cognitively induced 
conduct. 
Recent efforts to make the best scientific case for a link 
between cognition and conduct fall far short of the kind of 
dualistic model that underlies criminal liability. Under the Model 
Penal Code, a guilty defendant is presumed to have made some 
conscious choice to either bring about a specific illegal result 
(act with purpose), or to act despite being practically certain that 
a criminal outcome would result (act with knowledge), or act 
while consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk (act recklessly). The criminal law presumes a direct 
connection between a guilty mind and bad behavior. However, 
                                                          
7 See generally THE NEW UNCONSCIOUS (Ran R. Hassin et al. eds., 
2005) (discussing research that indicates that human behavior is less 
deliberate than it was traditionally thought to be). 
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the weight of cutting edge behavioral science research does not 
support this presumed link between thought and action. 
For example, in an article entitled Do Conscious Thoughts 
Cause Behavior?, Baumeister and his colleagues set out to take 
on the emerging consensus in the behavioral and neurosciences 
that “conscious thought has little or no impact on behavior.”8 
The authors use two different metaphors to explicate the role 
that conscious thought plays in behavior: a train whistle and a 
bomb fuse. They suggest that the current dominant view in the 
behavioral sciences analogizes the relationship between 
conscious thought and behavior to the role of a steam whistle on 
a train: “[I]t derives from and reveals something about activity 
inside the engine, but it has no causal impact on moving the 
train.”9 In short, “[b]ehavior does not originate with a conscious 
decision.”10 After reinterpreting the literature in the light most 
favorable to foundational legal presumptions, they settle on the 
analogy of conscious thoughts as serving a similar role as a fuse 
serves in detonating a bomb—it does not light the match or 
initiate the explosion but it serves a mediating role.11  Rather 
than serving as a direct or concurrent causal influence on 
behavior, as the law presumes (and indeed requires), Baumeister 
and colleagues conclude that the bulk of the research is more 
consistent with the view that conscious thought has “offline and 
indirect effects on later behavior.”12 Overall, they deduce that 
nothing they “reviewed would prove that any behavior emerged 
                                                          
8 See generally Roy F. Baumeister et al., Do Conscious Thoughts Cause 
Behavior?, 62 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 331 (2011). 
9 Id. at 332 (discussing the view articulated by Thomas Huxley in 1874). 
The writers then cite two of the current leading researchers in the field, who 
echo this view: “Conscious intentions signal the direction of action—but 
without causing the action . . . .” Id. (quoting Daniel M. Wegner & John A. 
Bargh, Control and Automaticity in Social Life, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 446, 456 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 1998)). 
10 Id. at 332 (quoting Ap Dijksterhuis et al., Effects of Priming and 
Perception on Social Behavior and Goal Pursuit, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: THE AUTOMATICITY OF HIGHER MENTAL PROCESSES 
51, 52 (John A. Bargh ed., 2007)). 
11 Id. at 334. 
12 Id. at 351. 
152 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
from exclusively conscious processes.”13 Yet, that is precisely 
the legal presumption that underlies traditional criminal law 
doctrine—that culpable mental states occur concurrently with and 
induce criminal behavior. Baumeister and his colleagues have 
tried to assemble the best available evidence against the 
prevailing view in the behavioral sciences that “conscious 
processes lack causal efficacy.”14 If the strongest case for the 
direct causal influence of mens rea on human behavior does not 
support traditional legal presumptions, then continued reliance 
on those presumptions in the law is misguided. In addition, 
continued reliance is unjust to the extent that such erroneous 
presumptions provide the moral justification for retributive 
punishment.15 
In addition to the lack of scientific evidence to support the 
view that conscious thought directly drives behavior, there are 
several additional reasons to challenge traditional legal 
presumptions about human behavior and the “evil doer” theory 
of crime they reflect. Early research conducted by Heider and 
Simmel16 suggests that human beings have a natural bias to read 
intentionality into behavior when they are asked to explain or 
judge the behavior of others, even when intentionality is not 
possible. For example, they conducted an experiment in which 
subjects observed the movement of three geometric figures (a 
large triangle, a small triangle, and a circle) and were asked to 
explain the movements of the figures. Nearly all of the subjects 
characterized the geometric figures as animated persons, even 
when they were asked nothing more than to “write down what 
happened in the picture.”17 When asked to interpret the 
movements of the figures as human actions, subjects typically 
attributed internal motives to the figures. Heider and Simmel 
concluded that when people see the big triangle “hitting” the 
                                                          
13 Id. at 354. 
14 Id. at 353. 
15 See Mark R. Fondacaro & Lauren G. Fasig, Judging Juvenile 
Responsibility: A Social Ecological Perspective, in HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN, 
CULTURE, AND VIOLENCE 355, 368 (Nancy E. Dowd et al. eds., 2006). 
16 See generally Fritz Heider & Marianne Simmel, An Experimental 
Study of Apparent Behavior, 57 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 243 (1944). 
17 Id. at 245. 
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little triangle (i.e., coming into contact), they tend to infer that 
the big triangle intends or desires to “hurt” the little triangle.18 
Thus, there seems to be a human readiness or tendency to over 
attribute the behavior of others to internal psychological 
attributes such as intentionality. This can have severe 
consequences for defendants under existing criminal law doctrine 
where jurors are asked in first degree murder trials whether the 
defendant premeditated and deliberated before killing the victim. 
Whether or not premeditation and deliberation are inferred can 
mean the difference between life and death for the defendant. 
Heider and Simmel’s work suggests that people may have a 
natural bias toward inferring internal mental states such as intent 
or desire to explain behavior even when an objective judgment 
would not support such an inference, as in the case of the 
movement of inanimate geometric figures. 
In addition to a human tendency to read intentionality into 
behavior when it does not or cannot exist, individuals who are 
asked to judge the mental state of another may be influenced by 
their own subjective experiences of conscious will. This can add 
bias to the task of retrospective mind reading if in fact the 
subjective experience of conscious will is illusory and has no 
causal influence over anyone’s behavior, either as an observer or 
as an actor. 
Wegner and Wheatley19 have conducted empirical research 
studies that support the view that the experience of conscious 
will is illusory. They found that people could be influenced to 
believe that they had deliberately willed a behavior by merely 
being asked to think about the behavior before it was 
involuntarily induced. The authors found that the subjective 
belief that conscious will had played a role in events was a 
function of the extent to which the thought directly preceded the 
action, was consistent or compatible with the action, and was the 
exclusive apparent cause of the action. They summarized their 
findings as follows: 
 The experience of will is the way our minds portray 
their operations to us, then, not their actual operation. 
                                                          
18 Id. at 257. 
19 Wegner & Wheatley, supra note 6, at 490. 
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Because we have thoughts of what we will do, we can 
develop causal theories relating those thoughts to our 
actions on the basis of priority, consistency, and 
exclusivity. We come to think of these prior thoughts as 
intentions, and we develop the strong sense that the 
intentions have causal force even though they are actually 
just previews of what we may do. The real causal 
mechanism is the marvelously intricate web of causation 
that is the topic of scientific psychology. The sense of 
will is not directly connected to this web and instead is 
an expression of our tendency to take what Dennett has 
called an “intentional stance” toward people. The 
intentional stance involves viewing psychological 
causation not in terms of causal mechanism but rather in 
terms of agents who have desires and beliefs that cause 
their acts. Conscious will is part of the process of taking 
an intentional stance toward oneself.  
 This analysis suggests that the real causal mechanisms 
underlying behavior are never present in consciousness. 
Rather, the engines of causation are unconscious 
mechanisms of mind.20 
Echoing this view, Bargh and Chartrand have summarized the 
available research and concluded that the lion’s share of human 
behavior is guided by non-conscious mental systems rather than 
conscious will.21 Finally, Libet conducted an influential study 
demonstrating that voluntary human acts and the subjective 
experience of intent that precede them are themselves preceded 
by unconscious brain activity, suggesting a subordinate role at 
best for conscious will as a causal initiating force driving human 
behavior.22 
To understand why the legal system, general public, and 
even members of the mental health and behavioral science 
communities continue to support traditional legal presumptions 
                                                          
20 Id. 
21 See John A. Bargh & Tanya L. Chartrand, The Unbearable 
Automaticity of Being, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 462 (1999). 
22 Benjamin Libet, Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of 
Conscious Will in Voluntary Action, 8 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 529, 536 (1985). 
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about human behavior that are inconsistent with scientific 
research, we turn to the topic of folk psychology.23 Folk 
psychology refers to the “fundamental assumptions [that people 
make about] human behavior and its relation to the mind,” 
including the capacity to infer mental states and what other 
people are thinking.24 In essence, folk psychology or a folk 
theory of mind reflects what individuals construe about what 
another person thinks or intends, which may or may not actually 
capture the subjective conscious experience of the other person.25 
So, even if folk psychology concepts correspond directly with 
legal concepts or standards of mens rea, neither folk nor legal 
concepts necessarily reflect an actual, accurate or valid 
characterization of what another person was (or was not) 
thinking at the time he or she disobeyed the law. 
Malle and Nelson have attempted to integrate aspects of 
“legal and layperson view[s] of human behavior” in an effort to 
clarify concepts of mens rea in the criminal law.26 They point 
out that research on folk psychology faces two primary 
challenges in the legal realm.27 The first challenge focuses on 
how to establish precise definitions of the concepts of mental 
states relevant to judgments about culpability; the second relates 
to how to determine the extent to which inferences about mental 
states are in fact “reliable and accurate.”28 Unfortunately, their 
research, like much of the research in this area, only focused on 
the first challenge, as they sought to determine the link between 
folk concepts and related legal concepts such as intentionality.29 
                                                          
23 See generally MALLE, supra note 5. 
24 Id. at 30–36. 
25 But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962) (including the other 
person’s subjective experience in the mens rea requirements for purpose, 
knowledge, and recklessness). 
26 Bertram F. Malle & Sarah E. Nelson, Judging Mens Rea: The Tension 
Between Folk Concepts and Legal Concepts of Intentionality, 21 BEHAV. SCI. 
& L. 563, 563 (2003). 
27 Id. at 564. 
28 Id. 
29 See id. at 566–78 (suggesting that the legal concepts of mens rea 
should be aligned with the ordinary meanings attached to them by 
laypersons). 
156 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Their results point to similarities and discrepancies between 
laypersons’ and legal concepts of mens rea, and they make some 
recommendations for bringing them both into better alignment. 
However, their research communicates little if anything about 
how closely judgments of mens rea based on folk concepts or 
legal concepts approximate what a defendant was thinking at the 
time he or she committed a crime. 
Other attempts to examine laypersons’ understandings of mental 
states empirically, and their correspondence with legal definitions 
of mental states, have met with very limited success.30 Again, none 
of this research gets at the deep and fundamental issue of whether 
judgments based on folk or legal concepts are accurate and valid. 
Moreover, as noted above, the weight of the behavioral science 
research relevant to the nature of the link between human mental 
states and behavior suggests that neither folk psychology nor legal 
presumptions about the role of mental states in criminal behavior 
are likely to be accurate enough to serve as a primary justification 
for retributive punishment. Overall, understanding limitations on 
the ability to read the minds of criminal defendants retrospectively 
may give us reason to question reliance on traditional legal 
presumptions as a justification for retributive punishment. 
Although the law is slow in tracking scientific advances, it 
can and has been moved by convincing theories and research—
consider, for example, how the law was nearly captured by the 
field of economics and the rational actor model of human 
behavior in the 1990s. However, there are emerging parallel 
trends in the behavioral sciences and the law that promise to 
converge to transform criminal law, beginning with the juvenile 
justice system. These trends, as will be noted in the next two 
sections, include a broadening of the focus in the behavioral 
sciences from conscious, atomistic mental states such as intent 
and deliberation, to unconscious processes and to dynamic, 
                                                          
30 See generally Laurence J. Severance et al., Inferring the Criminal 
Mind: Toward a Bridge Between Legal Doctrine and Psychological 
Understanding, 20 J. CRIM. JUST. 107 (1992). Severence discusses the results 
of his study, which was designed to detect “how laypeople, asked to serve as 
‘jurors,’ interpret and apply legal instructions on the definitions of culpable 
mental states.” Id. at 107 (“Laypeople do not comprehend mental state 
distinctions that are differentiated in legal doctrine.”). 
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contextual, and systemic influences on human behavior. 
Likewise, the trend in the law, and administrative law in 
particular, is to move away from a case-by-case adversarial 
model of dispute resolution to a more forward-looking, 
managerial system of due process that focuses on fairness and 
accuracy in decision making and the implementation of 
instrumental policy objectives. 
III. ECOLOGICAL MODELS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 
Social psychological research conducted throughout the 
twentieth century expanded the scope of inquiry about the causes 
of human behavior beyond the internal mental states of 
individuals to contextual and situational influences. For example, 
ecologically-oriented theorists such as Bronfenbrenner,31 Lewin,32 
and Moos33 have developed models of human behavior that focus 
on the dynamic relationship between the individual and aspects 
of his or her social environment. In contrast with traditional 
legal presumptions that suggest illegal behavior is the 
consequence of a conscious choice that can be fairly judged 
through a process of retrospective mind reading, an ecological 
perspective suggests that in order to understand why a person 
behaves the way he or she does on a particular occasion, one 
must understand the ongoing relationship between the individual 
and aspects of his or her social environment. 
Consistent with an ecological perspective, systematic 
research has demonstrated that people tend to overestimate the 
degree of personal or conscious control that others have over 
their behavior and tend to underestimate the importance of 
                                                          
31 See URIE BRONFENBRENNER, THE ECOLOGY OF HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT: EXPERIMENTS BY NATURE AND DESIGN (1979) (defining 
human development as a permanent change in the way a person views and 
handles his or her environment). 
32 See KURT LEWIN, PRINCIPLES OF TOPOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 166–92a 
(1935) (arguing that “changes both of the person and of environment” must 
be considered to understand “psychological processes”). 
33 See Rudolf H. Moos, Conceptualizations of Human Environments, 28 
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 652, 652–65 (1973) (arguing that knowledge of 
environmental conditions is essential to understanding human behavior). 
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situational influences—a phenomenon referred to in the 
behavioral science literature as the “fundamental attribution 
error.”34 For example, when people are confronted with the 
unusual behavior of others (e.g., the killing of a parent by a 
juvenile), they are prone to try to explain the behavior in terms 
of the juvenile’s psychological disposition (e.g., aggressiveness, 
impulsivity) rather than the objective situation facing the person 
(e.g., escalating physical abuse) or the person’s subjective 
construal of the situation (e.g., the belief that he will be killed if 
his father flies into a drunken rage). Other research supporting 
the importance of contextual influences on human behavior 
include Mischel’s analysis of studies demonstrating the 
importance of situational influences over personal characteristics 
on whether a person lies, cheats, or steals;35 Milgram’s work on 
obedience to authority and the willingness of otherwise typical 
citizens to administer powerful electric shocks to another person 
as punishment for providing incorrect answers;36 and the work of 
Darley and his associates demonstrating that ninety percent of 
seminary students who were in a hurry to give a lecture on the 
Good Samaritan parable were willing to walk right by a person 
asking for help.37 These classic social psychological studies 
provide additional evidence to challenging the “evil doer” theory 
of crime that bases culpability primarily on judgments of a past 
mental state rather than taking contextual influences into 
account. 
In addition to expanding the scope of analysis beyond mental 
states, ecological models have been helpful in identifying 
contextual domains that both influence deviant behavior (e.g., 
family, peers, school, and neighborhood) and can serve as levers 
of change to prevent criminal conduct. For example, 
                                                          
34 RICHARD E. NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES 
AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 120, 122–23 (1980). 
35 See WALTER MISCHEL, PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT 23–25 (George 
Mandler ed., 1968). 
36 Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & 
SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 371, 371–78 (1963).   
37 John M. Darley & C. Daniel Batson, “From Jerusalem to Jericho”: A 
Study of Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior, 27 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 100, 100–08 (1973). 
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Multisystemic Therapies have drawn on ecological theory and 
research and have developed a systematic intervention program 
focusing on multiple levels of analysis (psychological, 
interpersonal, community) in various life contexts associated 
with risk for delinquent behavior (e.g., social skill deficits, 
family conflict, peer pressure, school, neighborhood and 
community influences).38 Although traditional psychological 
interventions with juvenile offenders based on intrapsychic 
explanations of delinquency have been largely ineffective, state-
of-the-art multisystemic interventions have been able to reduce 
recidivism rates from around seventy percent to around twenty 
percent, even for very serious offenders. This suggests that a 
shift in focus away from retrospective mind reading and 
retributive models of juvenile justice toward a more forward-
looking risk management model focused on recidivism reduction 
and prevention of criminal behavior holds great promise for 
juvenile justice reform. Moreover, recent reconceptualizations of 
due process in the juvenile justice context provide opportunities 
for developing a forward-looking system aimed not at 
punishment or just deserts but the implementation of 
instrumental policy goals of recidivism reduction and crime 
prevention. 
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE MODELS OF DUE PROCESS 
The shift in the behavioral sciences toward more systemic 
models of human behavior is consistent with a shift in the law 
toward administrative models of due process.39 This shift began 
primarily to address dispute resolution in the civil law context 
and gradually migrated to areas like child support enforcement 
and drug and mental health courts. Procedural and efficiency 
considerations drove changes in the child support context. It was 
simply easier to process the large influx of cases and collect 
larger total sums of delinquent child support payments by using 
mass mailings threatening to revoke the motor vehicle or 
professional licenses of delinquent obligors if they failed to pay 
                                                          
38 See generally SLOBOGIN & FONDACARO, supra note 1. 
39 See generally Fondacaro et al., supra note 2. 
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their arrears than it was to use traditional adversarial trial 
procedures to pursue individual claims on a case-by-case basis.40 
In addition to efficiency considerations, institution of drug and 
mental health courts was driven by a change in substantive 
policy objectives—moving away from retributive punishment 
toward treatment and recidivism reduction. These new policy 
goals were facilitated by an increasingly managerial, 
administrative model that tracks the success and failure of 
individual defendants and various treatment programs. In the 
juvenile justice context, the need to handle large numbers of 
cases efficiently and effectively, coupled with a shift in policy 
towards evidence-based multisystemic interventions aimed at 
recidivism reduction and crime prevention, seems to invite a 
more administrative model of due process as well. 
In the adult criminal justice system, there are clear 
constitutional constraints on moving toward administrative 
procedures. For adult criminal defendants, specific adversarial 
procedures are required by the explicit texts of the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments. While due process is also fundamental to the 
juvenile justice system, due process for juveniles is anchored 
primarily in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and principles of “fundamental fairness,” not the 
explicit texts of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. This opens the 
door for procedural reform in the juvenile justice system that 
promotes fair, accurate and efficient decision making and 
facilitates the implementation of a multisystemic risk 
management model of juvenile justice aimed at promoting 
recidivism reduction and crime prevention. One of the major 
advantages of a fundamental fairness view of due process is that 
the degree of fairness and accuracy of decision making can be 
judged based on empirical evidence rather than by whether 
traditional procedural safeguards have been incorporated into the 
decision making process. Whether particular procedural 
safeguards actually enhance or diminish accuracy and fairness in 
                                                          
40 See Mark R. Fondacaro & Denise P. Stolle, Revoking Motor Vehicle 
and Professional Licenses for Purposes of Child Support Enforcement: 
Constitutional Challenges and Policy Implications, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 355, 357–63 (1996). 
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decision making is “recast into empirical hypotheses rather than 
framed, as they have been up to now, by reference to adult 
criminal procedure requirements.”41 
Administrative law scholars have been the first to suggest 
that the courts are not an institution particularly well-suited for 
taking useful advantage of behavioral science expertise.42 Courts 
tend to be reactive, backward looking, and to lack the necessary 
resources to locate and use research findings. Administrative 
bodies, on the other hand, are better equipped for this task. 
They tend to be forward looking, aimed at program and policy 
implementation, and to have the institutional expertise and 
resources to seek out and use behavioral science research to 
inform decision making. If a fundamental fairness approach to 
due process requires fair and accurate decision making 
performed in an efficient manner, then traditional procedural 
safeguards are seen as relevant but not necessarily essential. 
Procedural safeguards are considered to be consistent with a 
fundamental fairness view if they can be shown empirically to 
be tied to fairness, accuracy, and efficiency in decision making. 
This suggests that the attainment of fundamental fairness in 
juvenile justice might best be accomplished under an 
administrative model of decision making that puts in place a 
management system for the ongoing evaluation of both 
individual cases and the functioning of the system as a whole. 
Such a performance-based management system could focus on 
both procedural and substantive criteria—in essence, evaluating 
the accomplishment of both due process and recidivism 
reduction. As noted above, many of the questions about what 
constitutes due process would be recast into empirical questions. 
For example, does the assistance of counsel actually contribute 
to perceived fairness, to accuracy of decision making, or to 
better life outcomes for juveniles? Likewise, is cross-
examination actually the great engine of truthseeking, as the 
Supreme Court has characterized it? Or does is it actually 
contribute to obfuscation and delay, as others have suggested? 
Are judges necessarily the best decision makers with respect to 
                                                          
41 Fondacaro et al., supra note 2, at 985. 
42 Id. at 967–70. 
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truth seeking and fairness? What effect does the privilege against 
self-incrimination actually have on truth seeking? On perceived 
fairness? On substantive outcomes? Is this privilege perhaps less 
essential in a forward looking regime using effective, state-of-
the-art interventions? These are just a few of the questions that 
might be addressed by future research and the MRM model of 
juvenile justice.43 The next section outlines some of the basic 
principles of an MRM model, which provide a comprehensive 
framework for procedural and substantive reform. 
V. GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF A MULTISYSTEMIC RISK 
MANAGEMENT MODEL OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 
Several guiding principles to establishing an MRM model of 
juvenile justice can be distilled from an integration of the 
converging trends in the behavioral sciences and the law towards 
systemic approaches to decision making. However, it is 
important to note that these are only guiding principles and not a 
fixed alternative to the current juvenile justice system. What 
Professor Slobogin and I have proposed in our book, Juveniles 
at Risk: A Plea for Preventive Justice, is the development of a 
performance-based management system that promotes fair, 
accurate, and efficient decision making to facilitate achievement 
of the policy goals of recidivism reduction and crime prevention. 
If data shows that the current system can better advance these 
goals, then it should be kept in place until we find more 
effective alternatives that can be documented with empirical 
research. The current system and its various facets serve as the 
baseline for comparison. Overall, we offer a framework that is 
inherently a work in progress, subject to ongoing evaluation and 
evidence-based reform. 
The guiding principles of this framework, which are 
discussed in greater detail in Juveniles at Risk, include the 
following. First, the juvenile justice system should be forward 
looking and focused on behavior, rather than past mental states, 
and on recidivism reduction and crime prevention rather than 
retributive punishment. Second, a juvenile justice system based 
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on an MRM model should be grounded in administrative models 
of justice aimed at comprehensive, least restrictive risk 
management rather than culpability assessment. Third, decision 
making should be based on input and expertise of individuals 
from diverse disciplinary backgrounds. Legal training is not 
sufficient to address the range of organizational, clinical, 
psychological, developmental, educational, and evaluation 
research issues that must be managed. Fourth, decision making 
should be evidence-based, with the juvenile justice system 
serving as a natural laboratory for basic and applied research on 
procedural and substantive issues relevant to procedural justice, 
risk management, youth development, recidivism reduction, 
crime prevention, and public acceptance of alternatives to 
retributive punishment for juveniles. Finally, the juvenile justice 
system should be ecologically self-aware and have the 
organizational capacity to understand and foster mutually 
informative and beneficial relationships with other youth-
socializing institutions such as families, schools, communities, 
law enforcement, and the mental health, health care, and adult 
criminal justice systems. 
VI. OUTLINE OF A MULTISYSTEMIC RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL 
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 
This brings us to the question of what an MRM model of 
juvenile justice might look like. The general outline provided 
below is intended to serve as the basis for comparison with our 
current system:44 
 Jurisdiction is focused on overt behavior and 
determined by a legally-trained decision maker. 
 A Multidisciplinary Risk Management Team 
develops, implements, evaluates and refines an 
Individual Risk Management Plan. 
 Data and feedback from IRMP are used to guide 
intervention and termination of intervention at the 
individual level. 
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 Case-level data is incorporated into a system-wide 
Information Management System that is used to 
guide program and policy development and 
reform. 
 Outreach and program evaluation are built into the 
juvenile justice system. 
The juvenile justice system envisioned above has the 
potential to be quite different from the retributive- and 
punishment-oriented regimes currently in place throughout the 
United States. This Article has attempted to outline why the 
juvenile justice system should change, and how it could be 
reformed.  First, the current system is rooted in an outdated 
model of criminal justice—one that focuses on culpability 
assessment and retributive punishment rooted in notions of just 
deserts.  While the retributive model purports to reflect moral 
judgment, it really reflects retrospective social judgment based 
on an overly narrow focus on mental states that humans 
(including judges and jurors) have great difficulty assessing 
accurately and which the scientific consensus suggests has little 
if any direct causal influence on behavior. Given the weight of 
the scientific evidence, to continue the status quo is likely not 
only misguided, but unjust. Reform is clearly warranted. 
However, this does not mean that the system can, will, or 
should be transformed overnight. The current system can serve 
as a baseline for reform. Some states may pursue small and 
incremental changes. Others may opt for large scale systemic 
reforms. In all cases, the key consideration is whether the 
reforms are making things better or worse than the status quo. 
In order to achieve reforms, those interested in promoting 
juvenile justice must capitalize on converging trends in the 
behavioral sciences and the law toward more forward-looking, 
systemic models of decision making and policy implementation. 
The juvenile justice system may be an ideal place to initiate such 
reforms.  First of all, the juvenile justice system is afforded 
greater legal flexibility regarding due process considerations.  
Secondly, the general public is more willing to let go of the 
reflexive urge to punish juvenile offenders, and to embrace more 
rational policy objectives such as recidivism reduction and crime 
prevention in the juvenile justice context. We have the tools 
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necessary in both the behavioral sciences and the law to create a 
truly fair and just juvenile justice system. This Article is an 
attempt to stimulate debate and endorse evidence-based reforms. 
 
